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The ethical implications of developing and using artificial intelligence and robotics in the civilian 
and military spheres
Summary
Machine-mediated human interaction challenges the philosophical basis of human existence and 
ethical conduct. Aside from technical challenges of ensuring ethical conduct in artificial 
intelligence and robotics, there are moral questions about the desirability of replacing human 
functions and the human mind with such technology. How will artificial intelligence and robotics 
engage in moral reasoning in order to act ethically? Is there a need for a new set of moral rules? 
What happens to human interaction when it is mediated by technology? Should such technology 
be used to end human life? Who bears responsibility for wrongdoing or harmful conduct by 
artificial intelligence and robotics? This paper seeks to address some ethical issues surrounding 
the development and use of artificial intelligence and robotics in the civilian and military spheres. 
It explores the implications of fully autonomous and human-machine rule-generating approaches, 
the difference between “human will” and “machine will, and between machine logic and human 
judgment.
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Introduction
1. Artificial intelligence and robotics is pervasive in daily life and set to expand to new levels 
potentially replacing human decision-making and action. Self-driving cars, home and 
healthcare robots, and autonomous weapons are some examples. A distinction appears to be 
emerging between potentially benevolent civilian uses of the technology (e.g. unmanned 
aerial vehicles delivering medicines), and potentially malevolent military uses (e.g. lethal 
autonomous weapons killing human combatants). Machine-mediated human interaction 
challenges the philosophical basis of human existence and ethical conduct. Aside from 
technical challenges of ensuring ethical conduct in artificial intelligence and robotics, there are 
moral questions about the desirability of replacing human functions and the human mind with 
such technology. How will artificial intelligence and robotics engage in moral reasoning in 
order to act ethically? Is there a need for a new set of moral rules? What happens to human 
interaction when it is mediated by technology? Should such technology be used to end human 
life? Who bears responsibility for wrongdoing or harmful conduct by artificial intelligence and 
robotics?
2. This paper seeks to address some ethical issues surrounding the development and use of 
artificial intelligence and robotics in the civilian and military spheres. It explores the 
implications of fully autonomous and human-machine rule-generating approaches, the 
difference between “human will” and “machine will, and between machine logic and human 
judgment.
Fully autonomous and human-machine rule-generating approaches
3. Artificial intelligence and robotics do not possess human rational thinking capacity or a free 
will to be able to understand what constitutes a rule that is inherently desirable, doable, and 
valuable for it to be capable of universalisation. But there is human agency in the design, 
development, testing, and deployment of such technology so that responsibility for 
implementing moral rules resides with humans. Humans determine which rules are 
programmed into the technology to ensure ethical use and moral conduct. For these rules to 
be capable of universalisation they must be “public and shareable”.
4. In the civilian sphere, for example, there is much debate about open access and use of 
artificial intelligence to gather personal data, potentially compromising privacy. In the military 
sphere, discussions on lethal autonomous weapons under the auspices of the UN Convention 
on Certain Conventional Weapons represent a process for universalisation of rules which may 
regulate or ban such weapons. Indeed, there is emerging opinio juris among some states for a 
preventative prohibition rule, and a majority of states recognise that any rules regulating 
lethal autonomous weapons must take account of ethical, legal, and humanitarian 
considerations.1 
5. The potentially broad purposes and uses of artificial intelligence and robotics technology may 
lead to competing rules emerging which may or may not be capable of universalisation. Some 
preliminary issues related to the nature and type of rules are considered here.
6. How will rules be generated to regulate ethical use and operation of the technology? This 
depends on whether the technology is intended to completely replace human functions and 
rational thinking or to complement and supplement such human characteristics. Fully 
autonomous technology refers to artificial intelligence and robotics replacing human rational 
thinking capacity and free will so that rules emerge from the technology itself rather than 
humans. Human-machine integrated technology, on the other hand, refers to technology that 
supports and assists humans in certain circumstances so that rules are created, influenced, 
controlled, and tailored by a combination of human and machine interaction and intervention. 
Both kinds of rule-generating approaches have ethical implications.
a) Fully autonomous rule-generating approach
7. A fully autonomous rule-generating approach would mean the technology produces its own 
rules and conduct without reference to or intervention from humans. After the initial design 
1 See, O Ulgen, ‘‘World Community Interest’ approach to interim measures on ‘robot weapons’: revisiting the Nuclear 
Test Cases’’ (2016) 14 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law (forthcoming) Section III.A.
and programming by humans, the technology makes its own decisions. This is “machine 
learning” or “dynamic learning systems” whereby the machine relies on its own databank and 
experiences to generate future rules and conduct.2 Fully autonomous weapons systems, for 
example, would have independent thinking capacity as regards acquiring, tracking, selecting, 
and attacking human targets in warfare based on previous experience of military scenarios.3 
Such an approach presents challenges.
8. There is uncertainty and unpredictability in the rules that a fully autonomous weapons system 
would generate beyond what it has been designed to do, so that it would not comply with 
international humanitarian law or ethics. In the civilian sphere, fully autonomous technology 
may generate rules that adversely impact on human self-worth and progress by causing 
human redundancies, unemployment, and income instability and inequality. Adverse impact 
on human self-worth and progress, and uncertainty and unpredictability in the rule-generating 
process are contrary to what is fundamentally beneficial to humankind; such a process cannot 
produce rules that are inherently desirable, doable, valuable, and capable of universalisation. 
A perverse “machine subjectivity” or “machine free will” would exist without any constraints.
b) Human-machine rule-generating approach
9. A human-machine rule-generating approach currently exists in both the civilian and military 
spheres. IBM, for example, prefers the term “augmented intelligence” rather than artificial 
intelligence because this better reflects their aim to build systems that enhance and scale 
human expertise and skills rather than replace them.4 The technology is focused on practical 
applications that assist people in performing well-defined tasks (e.g. robots that clean houses; 
robots working with humans in production chains; warehouse robots that take care of the 
tasks of an entire warehouse; companion robots that entertain, talk, and help elderly people 
maintain contact with friends, relatives, and doctors). In the military sphere, remotely 
controlled and semi-autonomous weapons combine human action with weapons technology. 
Human intervention is necessary to determine when it is appropriate to carry out an attack 
command or to activate an abort mechanism.
10. This kind of rule-generating approach keeps the human at the centre of decision-making. But 
what happens if there are interface problems between the human and machine (e.g. errors; 
performance failures; breakdown of communication; loss of communication link; mis-
coordination)?5 This may prove fatal in human-weapon integrated systems reliant on 
communication and co-ordination, and a back-up system would need to be in place to 
suspend or abort operations. What happens if the technology is hacked to produce alternative 
2 See, P M Asaro, ‘Roberto Cordeschi on Cybernetics and Autonomous Weapons: Reflections and Responses’ (2015) 3 
Paradigmi. Rivistadi critica filosofina 83-107, 96-98; M J Embrechts, F Rossi, F-M Schleif, and J A Lee, ‘Advances in 
artificial neural networks, machine learning,and computational intelligence’ (2014) 141 Neurocomputing 1-2.
3 See, Report of the ICRC Expert Meeting, Autonomous Weapon Systems: Technical, Military, Legal and Humanitarian 
Aspects (9 May 2014) (‘2014 ICRC Report’); Report of the ICRC Expert Meeting, Autonomous Weapon Systems: 
Implications of Increasing Autonomy in the Critical Functions of Weapons (15-16 March 2016) (‘2016 ICRC Report’); O 
Ulgen, ‘Autonomous UAV and Removal of Human Central Thinking Activities: Implications for Legitimate Targeting, 
Proportionality, and Unnecessary Suffering’ (forthcoming) 1-45.
4 F Rossi, ‘Artificial Intelligence: Potential Benefits and Ethical Considerations’, Briefing Paper to the European Union 
Parliament Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs European Parliament (October 2016) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/571380/IPOL_BRI(2016)571380_EN.pdf> accessed 26 
August 2017.
5 P M Asaro, ‘Roberto Cordeschi on Cybernetics and Autonomous Weapons: Reflections and Responses’ (2015) 3 
Paradigmi. Rivistadi critica filosofina 90-91.
or random rules that cause malfunction, non-performance, or harmful effects? The same 
problem applies to fully autonomous technology and seems a good reason for restricting use 
and performance capability to set tasks, controlled scenarios or environments where any 
potential harm is containable.
Difference between “human will” and “machine will”
11. Kant defined autonomy of will as “the property the will has of being a law to itself 
(independently of every property belonging to the object of volition)”.6 This may sound 
chaotic and advocating freedom for humans to do as they please but it is the starting point to 
explaining how morals come about and how humans should conduct themselves. The ultimate 
aim of morality is freedom and, therefore, whether conduct is right or wrong is dependent on 
the extent to which it achieves freedom. If doing something enhances our freedom and can 
also be universalised to enhance the freedom of others, then it becomes a moral action.
12. Kant’s autonomy of will is hard to transpose into technology because it is reliant on concepts 
such as self-worth, dignity, freedom, and interaction. A machine would not have a sense of 
these concepts or be able to attach value to them. “Human will” develops through character 
and experience to inform moral conduct. “Machine learning” or “dynamic learning systems” 
that generate rules and conduct based on a databank of previous experiences may resemble a 
form of “machine will” that makes ethical choices based on internally learned rules of 
behaviour.7 But the human will is much more dynamic, elusive, and able to cope with 
spontaneity in reaction to novel situations which sit outside rule-based behavioural action and 
derive from human experience and intuition.
13. Autonomy of will requires inner and outer development of the person to reach a state of 
moral standing and be able to engage in moral conduct. This is suggestive of an innate sense 
of right and wrong. The inner aspect requires adoption and adherence to principles that 
enhance self-worth and dignity in our person without falling to temptation, personal desires, 
or external coercion. Examples include avoiding immoral conduct, constantly striving to move 
from a state of nature to an improved rightful or lawful condition.8 By enhancing our self-
worth and dignity these principles enable us to function freely as rational beings with 
autonomy of will. The outer aspect is controlled by principles that enable interaction with 
others and are capable of universalisation. For example, we accept and abide by the general 
principle that human interaction should be conducted without resorting to violence. In 
adhering to this principle we are not just motivated by self-preservation but also a higher 
norm of preserving freedom; if we start conducting our affairs through violence our 
interaction will become unstable, unpredictable, and unable to guarantee personal freedom 
or that of others. Can machines emulate this sort of autonomy?
14. Artificial intelligence in autonomous weapons may allow machine logic to develop over time 
to identify correct and incorrect action, showing a limited sense of autonomy. But the machine 
6 I Kant, The Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (H.J. Paton tr, Hutchinson & Co 1969) 101 
[440]. 
7 M O Riedl, ‘Computational Narrative Intelligence: A Human-Centered Goal for Artificial Intelligence’ (2016) CHI’16 
Workshop on Human-Centered Machine Learning, May 8, 2016, San Jose, California, USA; M O Riedl and B Harrison, 
‘Using Stories to Teach Human Values to Artificial Agents’ (2015) Association for the Advancement of Artificial 
Intelligence.
8 I Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals  (Mary Gregor tr and ed, CUP 1996) 173-218.
does not possess a “will” of its own nor does it understand what freedom is and how to go 
about attaining it by adopting principles that will develop inner and outer autonomy of will. It 
has no self-determining capacity that can make choices between varying degrees of right and 
wrong. The human can decide to question or go against the rules but the machine cannot, 
except in circumstances of malfunction and mis-programming. It has no conception of 
freedom and how this could be enhanced for itself as well as humans. The machine will not be 
burdened by moral dilemmas so the deliberative and reflective part of decision-making (vital 
for understanding consequences of actions and ensuring proportionate responses) is 
completely absent.
15. There is a limited sense in which artificial intelligence and robotics may mimic the outer aspect 
of Kant’s autonomy of will. Robots may have a common code of interaction to promote 
cooperation and avoid conflict among themselves. Autonomous weapons operating in swarms 
may develop principles that govern how they interact and coordinate action to avoid collision 
and errors. But these are examples of functional, machine-to-machine interaction that do not 
extend to human interaction, and so do not represent a form of autonomy of will that is 
capable of universalisation.
Trust and the technology
16. When we talk about trust in the context of using artificial intelligence and robotics what we 
actually mean is reliability. Trust relates to claims and actions people make and is not an 
abstract thing.9 Machines without autonomy of will, in the Kantian sense, and without an 
ability to make claims cannot be attributed with trust. Algorithms cannot determine whether 
something is trustworthy or not. So trust is used metaphorically to denote functional 
reliability; that the machine performs tasks for the set purpose without error or minimal error 
that is acceptable.
17. But there is also an extension of this notion of trust connected to human agency in the 
development and uses to which artificial intelligence and robotics are put. Can we trust the 
humans involved in developing such technologies that they will do so with ethical 
considerations in mind (i.e. limiting unnecessary suffering and harm to humans, not violating 
fundamental human rights)? Once the technology is developed, can we trust those who will 
make use of it to do so for benevolent rather than malevolent purposes? These questions 
often surface in debates on data protection and the right to privacy in relation to personal 
data trawling activities of technologies. Again, this goes back to what values will be installed 
that reflect ethical conduct and allow the technology to distinguish right from wrong.
The difference between machine logic and human judgment
18. When we compare machines to humans there is a clear difference between the logic of a 
calculating machine and the wisdom of human judgment.10 Machines perform cost effective 
and speedy peripheral processing activities based on quantitative analysis, repetitive actions, 
and sorting data (e.g. mine clearance; and detection of improvised explosive devices). They 
are good at automatic reasoning and can outperform humans in such activities. But they lack 
the deliberative and sentient aspects of human reasoning necessary in human scenarios 
where artificial intelligence may be used. They do not possess complex cognitive ability to 
9 O O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (CUP 2002).
10 J Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human reason: from judgment to calculation (1976).
appraise a given situation, exercise judgment, and refrain from taking action or limit harm. 
Unlike humans who can pull back at the last minute or choose a workable alternative, robots 
have no instinctive or intuitive ability to do the same. For example, during warfare the use of 
discretion is important to implementing rules on preventing unnecessary suffering, taking 
precautionary measures, and assessing proportionality. Such discretion is absent in robots.11
19. How will artificial intelligence and robotics engage in moral reasoning in order to act ethically? 
Should the technology possess universal or particular moral reasoning? Ongoing 
developments in the civilian and military spheres highlight moral dilemmas and the 
importance of human moral reasoning to mediate between competing societal interests and 
values. Companion robots may need to be mindful of privacy and security issues (e.g. 
protection and disclosure of personal data; strangers who may pose a threat to the person’s 
property, physical and mental well-being) related to assisting their human companion and 
interacting with third parties (e.g. hospitals; banks; public authorities). Companion robots may 
need to be designed so that they do not have complete control over their human companion’s 
life which undermines human dignity, autonomy, and privacy. Robots in general may need to 
lack the ability to deceive and manipulate humans so that human rational thinking and free 
will remain. Then there is the issue of whether fully autonomous weapons should be 
developed to replace human combatants in the lethal force decision-making process to kill 
another human being. Is there a universal moral reasoning that the technology could possess 
to solve such dilemmas? Or would it have to possess a particular moral reasoning, specific to 
the technology or scenario?
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11 See, E Lieblich and E Benvenisti, ‘The Obligation to Exercise Discretion in Warfare: Why Autonomous Weapons 
Systems Are Unlawful’, in Autonomous Weapons Systems Law, Ethics, Policy (N. Bhuta, S. Beck, R. Geiβ, Liu Hin-Yan, C. 
Kreβ eds., 2016).
